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I n The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, Adam Smith famously argued thateconomic behavior was motivated by self-interest. But 17 years earlier in 1759,Smith had proposed a theory of human behavior that looks anything but self-
interested. In his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argued that behavior
was determined by the struggle between what Smith termed the “passions” and the
“impartial spectator.” The passions included drives such as hunger and sex, emotions
such as fear and anger, and motivational feeling states such as pain. Smith viewed
behavior as under the direct control of the passions, but believed that people could
override passion-driven behavior by viewing their own behavior from the perspective of
an outsider—the impartial spectator—a “moral hector who, looking over the shoulder
of the economic man, scrutinizes every move he makes” (Grampp, 1948, p. 317).1
1 A long-standing dispute has raged over whether Adam Smith’s view of human motivation as expressed
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments complements or contradicts the view of human motivation expressed in
The Wealth of Nations. Although much has been written about “das Adam Smith problem” of reconciling
these texts, most modern Smith scholarship asserts that there is no essential contradiction between the
texts. As the editors of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith edition
of The Theory of Moral Sentiments write, “the so called ‘Adam Smith problem’ was a pseudo-problem based
on ignorance and misunderstanding. Anybody who reads The Theory of Moral Sentiments, first in one of
the earlier editions and then in edition six, will not have the slightest inclination to be puzzled that the
same man wrote this book and The Wealth of Nations, nor to suppose that he underwent any radical
change of view about human conduct.”
y Nava Ashraf is Assistant Professor in the Negotiation, Organizations and Markets Group at
Harvard Business School, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Colin Camerer is Rea A. and Lela G.
Axline Professor of Business Economics, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California.
George Loewenstein is Professor of Economics and Psychology, Department of Social and Decision
Sciences, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Their e-mail addresses are
ashraf@fas.harvard.edu, camerer@hss.caltech.edu and gl20@andrew.cmu.edu, respectively.
Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 19, Number 3—Summer 2005—Pages 000–000
Fn1
tapraid1/z30-jep/z30-jep/z3000305/z300587d05a longd S5 6/30/05 11:53 Art: Input-yyy(psf)
The “impartial spectator” plays many roles in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
When it comes to choices that involve short-term gratification but long-term costs,
the impartial spectator serves as the source of “self-denial, of self-government, of
that command of the passions which subjects all the movements of our nature to
what our own dignity and honour, and the propriety of our own conduct, require”
(Smith, 1759 [1981], I, i, v, 26), much like a farsighted “planner” entering into
conflict with short-sighted “doers” (Shefrin and Thaler, 1981). In social situations,
the impartial spectator plays the role of a conscience, dispassionately weighing the
conflicting needs of different persons. Smith (I, i, v, 29) recognized, however, that
the impartial spectator could be led astray or rendered impotent by sufficiently
intense passions: “There are some situations which bear so hard upon human
nature that the greatest degree of self-government . . . is not able to stifle, alto-
gether, the voice of human weakness, or reduce the violence of the passions to that
pitch of moderation, in which the impartial spectator can entirely enter into them.”
Adam Smith’s psychological perspective in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is
remarkably similar to “dual-process” frameworks advanced by psychologists (for
example, Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992; Sloman, 1996; Metcalfe and Mischel,
1999), neuroscientists (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998) and more
recently by behavioral economists, based on behavioral data and detailed observa-
tions of brain functioning (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Benhabib and Bisin, 2004;
Fudenberg and Levine, 2004; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2004). It also antic-
ipates a wide range of insights regarding phenomena such as loss aversion, will-
power and fairness (V. Smith, 1998) that have been the focus of modern behavioral
economics (see Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004, for a recent review). The purpose
of this essay is to draw attention to some of these connections. Indeed, as we
propose at the end of the paper, The Theory of Moral Sentiments suggests promising
directions for economic research that have not yet been exploited.
Preferences and the Dual-Process Perspective
The Theory of Moral Sentiments is packed with insights about preferences, using
the dual-process framework of the passions and the impartial spectator. Some of
the discussion relates to aspects of individual preference and judgment: what we
would today call loss aversion, intertemporal choice and overconfidence. Other
parts of the discussion focus on preferences that arise in social contexts: altruism,
fairness and how they together generate trust in markets.
Loss Aversion
Approximately 200 years before Kahneman and Tversky (1979) identified the
regularity in choices that has come to be known as “loss aversion,” Adam Smith
(1759, III, ii, 176–177) displayed an acute awareness of loss-aversion as an experi-
ential phenomenon: “Pain . . . is, in almost all cases, a more pungent sensation than
the opposite and correspondent pleasure. The one almost always depresses us
much more below the ordinary, or what may be called the natural state of our
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happiness, than the other ever raises us above it.” Smith also drew attention to what
behavioral economists would now refer to as the underweighting of opportunity costs
relative to out-of-pocket costs. Smith (II, ii, ii, 121) notes that “breach of property,
therefore, theft and robbery, which take from us what we are possessed of, are
greater crimes than breach of contract, which only disappoints us of what we
expected.”2
Modern research has not only produced a wealth of evidence supporting both
of these effects, but brain imaging technology has shown that that losses and gains
are processed in different regions of the brain (O’Doherty, Kringelback, Rolls,
Hornak and Andrews, 2001), suggesting that gains and losses may be processed in
qualitatively different ways. Moreover, a body of literature has shown that when loss
aversion is combined with narrow bracketing of decisions—the tendency to take
decisions one at a time without considering the big picture—its effects are evident
in asset returns (Benartzi and Thaler, 1997), labor supply (Camerer, Babcock,
Loewenstein and Thaler, 1997), the reluctance to sell losing stocks and houses
(Odean, 1998; Genesove and Mayer, 2001) and large gaps between buying and
selling prices (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990).
Intertemporal Choice and Self-Control
Intertemporal choice offers a straightforward application of Smith’s dual
process model. Smith (1759, IV, ii, 273) viewed the passions as largely myopic: “The
pleasure which we are to enjoy ten years hence, interests us so little in comparison
with that which we may enjoy to-day, the passion which the first excites, is naturally
so weak in comparison with that violent emotion which the second is apt to give
occasion to, that the one could never be any balance to the other, unless it was
supported by the sense of propriety.” “The spectator,” in contrast, “does not feel the
solicitations of our present appetites. To him the pleasure which we are to enjoy a
week hence, or a year hence, is just as interesting as that which we are to enjoy this
moment” (IV, ii, 272).
The struggle between the myopic passions and farsighted impartial spectator
appears later in behavioral economics in the form of a “doer” and “planner” in
Shefrin and Thaler (1981; see also Benabou and Pyciak, 2002; Bernheim and
Rangel, 2002). What are now called “quasi-hyperbolic discounting models” (Laib-
son, 1997), in a similar spirit, have also been used by Angeletos, Laibson, Tobac-
man, Repetto and Weinberg (2001) to study life cycle saving, by O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999) to study life cycle temptation and by Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2004) to
study demand for committed savings in the Philippines.3 Moreover, recent research
2 Thaler (1980), who first drew attention to the underweighting of opportunity costs relative to
out-of-pocket costs, attributes it to loss aversion; opportunity costs are treated as foregone gains, rather
than as losses.
3 Using the terms of Laibson (1997), these are sometimes called  –  discounting models. Mapped
roughly onto Smith’s terms,  is the weight on all future outcomes, so that 1/ represents the relative
strength of the passions that prefer immediate rewards, and  is a conventional discount rate. Smith’s
passage above suggests that the impartial spectator uses   1.
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in which decision-makers’ brains were scanned while they made intertemporal
choices vindicates Smith’s view that decisions that provide the potential for plea-
sures which we may enjoy today activate emotional regions of the brain in a way that
decisions involving only delayed outcomes do not (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein
and Cohen, 2004).
Overconfidence
Adam Smith (1776, I, x, 1) wrote about the “over-weening conceit which the
greater part of men have of their own abilities,” a pattern of judgment that
influences preferences over risky choices. According to Smith, “the chance of gain
is by every man more or less over-valued, and the chance of loss is by most men
under-valued, and by scarce any man, who is in tolerable health and spirits, valued
more than it is worth.”
Smith’s “overweening conceit” reappears in modern behavioral economics in
the form of executive “hubris” that motivates the failure of so many mergers (Roll,
1986) and other business failures (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999) and can be derived
theoretically from evolutionary considerations (Waldman, 1993; Compte and Pos-
telwaite, 2005). Moreover, Smith’s caveat that overconfidence only applies to those
in “tolerable health and spirits” anticipates modern studies showing that people
who are not in tolerable health and spirits—specifically, the clinically depressed—
are the exceptional ones among us who are not optimistic wishful thinkers (for
example, Taylor and Brown, 1994).
Altruism
Judging from the extensive treatment that Adam Smith gave to sympathy in The
Moral Sentiments, he viewed it as one of the more important passions. However, he
also viewed sympathy as an extremely unreliable guide to moral behavior, some-
times falling short and sometimes exceeding what is morally required.
Smith argued that natural sympathy often falls short of what is morally justified
by mass misery. In one evocative passage he noted the striking lack of sympathy that
a resident of Europe would be likely to have of an earthquake that eliminated the
population of China. After expressing “very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune
of that unhappy people,” Smith (1759, III, iii, 192–193) commented, such an
individual would likely “pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his
diversion, with the same ease and tranquility as if no such accident had hap-
pened . . . . If he was to lose his little finger to morrow, he would not sleep to-night;
but, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over
the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren.” Although modern media may help
to bring vivid images of distant tragedies into people’s homes (like the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami), thus reducing social distance, such imagery does so in a highly
selective fashion that only amplifies Smith’s concerns. Recent incidents caught on
videotape capture the public’s sympathies, but more serious problems that society
may have adapted to, or that don’t lend themselves to vivid imagery, are as likely as
they were in Smith’s time to elicit a paucity of sympathy.
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In other cases, Smith believed that people experience sympathy that is com-
pletely out of proportion to the plight of the individual one feels sympathetic
toward. “We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be
altogether incapable,” Smith (1759, I, i, i, 7–8) wrote. “What are the pangs of a
mother, when she hears the moanings of her infant, that, during the agony of
disease, cannot express what it feels? In her idea of what it suffers, she joins, to its
real helplessness, her own consciousness of that helplessness, and her own terrors
for the unknown consequences of its disorder; and out of all these, forms, for her
own sorrow, the most complete image of misery and distress. The infant, however, feels
only the uneasiness of the present instant, which can never be great.” Smith adds dryly
that “we sympathize even with the dead,” who themselves experience nothing.
If humans were under the control of their passions, one could expect to
observe extreme callousness alternating with remarkable generosity, with little logic
or consistency governing the transitions. This tendency is manifested in the “iden-
tifiable victim effect,” in which people sympathize more with a known victim than
with a statistical likelihood that a not-yet-known person who is likely to be victimized
(Schelling, 1984; Small and Loewenstein, 2003). In the political economy, fluctu-
ations in sympathy probably influence public policies, creating huge inconsisten-
cies in the implicit value that different policies place on saving a human life (Tengs
and Graham, 1996).
Controlled economics experiments show some fluctuations in expressed sym-
pathy, too. For example, in “dictator game” experiments, people simply divide a
known sum of money between themselves and another person. Absent any knowl-
edge about the target recipient, people offer an average of 20 percent (offers of
nothing and half are most common; Camerer, 2003, chapter 2). When dictators
know the recipient is the Red Cross, rather than a fellow student, the average
allocation doubles (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). When the recipient stands up and
gives a few facts about him- or herself, the average amount given goes up to half and
the variance increases—as if dictator givers generally sympathize when they know a
little about somebody, but also make snap character judgments of who is deserving
and who is not (Bohnet and Frey, 1999).
These fluctuations in sympathy are moderated, according to Smith, by the
impartial spectator. Returning to the case of devastation in China, Smith (1759, III,
iii, 192) asks whether his representative European would be willing to “sacrifice the
lives of a hundred millions of his brethren” to save the injury to his little finger.
Smith concludes that the answer is “No”: “Human nature startles with horror at the
thought, and the world, in its greatest depravity and corruption, never produced
such a villain as could be capable of entertaining it.” The impartial spectator
recognizes (194) that “we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than
any other in it.”
Fairness
Although Smith viewed altruism as a somewhat erratic force, he believed that
other motivations played a more reliable civilizing role. Chief among these other
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motivations was fairness. Smith (1759, II, ii, iii, 125) writes: “Nature has implanted
in the human breast, that consciousness of ill-desert, those terrors of merited
punishment which attend upon its violation, as the great safe-guards of the associ-
ation of mankind, to protect the weak, to curb the violent, and to chastise the
guilty.” Smith believed this natural sentiment toward fairness was the source of the
virtue of justice, which he saw as the “main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If
it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society . . . must in a moment
crumble to atoms.” Moreover, Smith (129) viewed the desire for justice as some-
thing primal: “All men, even the most stupid and unthinking, abhor fraud, perfidy,
and injustice, and delight to see them punished. But few men have reflected upon
the necessity of justice to the existence of society, how obvious soever that necessity
may appear to be.”
Modern research suggests that an innate concern for fairness extends even
beyond humans to other primates. Capuchin monkeys will reject small rewards
when they see other monkeys they perceive as undeserving getting more than they
do (Brosnan and de Waal, 2002). Cotton-top tamarins will pull a lever to give
marshmallows (which tamarins love) to other tamirins who have altruistically
rewarded them with marshmallows in earlier lever-pulls more often then they will
pull levers to tamarins who were not previously altruistic (Hauser, Chen, Chen and
Chang, 2003).
The impartial spectator plays an essential role in fairness, by causing individ-
uals to internalize other people’s sense of fairness by viewing their own actions
through the eyes of an objective observer. Smith (1759, III, iii, 195) argues: “There
is no commonly honest man who does not dread the inward disgrace of such an
action.”
Altruism, Fairness and Market Interactions
Market interactions require, as Boulding (1969, p. 5) points out, “a minimum
degree of benevolence even in exchange without which it cannot be legitimated
and cannot operate as a social organizer.” Arrow (1974) also notes the importance
of trust as a lubricant of exchange, economizing on the costs of gathering infor-
mation about trading partners. For Adam Smith, a mixture of the concerns over
fairness (enforced by the fear of negative appraisal by the impartial spectator) and
altruism played an essential role in market interactions, allowing trust, repeated
transactions and material gains to occur.
Smith described the beginnings of market exchange thus: “in a nation of
hunters, if any one has a talent for making bows and arrows better than his
neighbours he will at first make presents of them, and in return get presents of their
game. By continuing this practice he will live better than before and will have no
occasion to provide for himself, as the surplus of his own labor does it more
effectually” (Smith, 1762–1763, 220).
As Jeffrey Young (1997, p. 62) remarks, “[T]he other regarding principles of
human nature which bind people together in society are a necessary condition for
the emergence of the exchange of surplus produce amongst neighbours. Smith
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uses the moral side of human nature to help him explain why voluntary agreement
and not violence takes place when these two hunters meet.”
In experiments, norms of positive reciprocity often create trust where it has no
business flourishing (according to the textbook view that emphasizes moral hazard
when contracts are incomplete)—among strangers in one-shot transactions. For
example, in simple “trust game” experiments, subjects decide how much money to
put in a mailbox, and their investment is tripled (representing a socially productive
return). A second subject takes the tripled money out and can keep it all, or repay
some to the original investor. Most experiments show that the second subject does
repay money, even in one-shot games that control for anonymity, and they typically
repay just enough to make the investment worthwhile (Berg, Dickhaut and Mc-
Cabe, 1995; Camerer, 2003, chapter 2). Experiments run in Russia, South Africa
and the United States showed that many trustors do not even expect to make
money, but are motivated to “invest” by pure “warm-glow” altruism (Ashraf, Bohnet
and Piankov, 2003). Simple models that incorporate a preference for fairness or
equality have been developed and applied to a broad range of games (Rabin, 1993;
in this journal, Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).
Furthermore, trust, as measured in simple surveys, is strongly correlated with
economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997) (though the direction of causality is
unknown). An anthropology experiment involving 15 small-scale societies found
that in societies in which people buy and sell more often in markets, offers in
ultimatum bargaining games4 are, perhaps surprisingly, closer to equal sharing
than in less market intensive societies (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Gintis, Fehr and
Camerer, 2004). Adam Smith would not be surprised by the finding that markets
are often built on motivations of fairness, altruism and trust—rather than on
self-interest alone—yet this mixture of motivations remains a challenge to the
modern economics profession.
Consumption and Its Discontents
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argues that much economic activity is
the product of a forecasting error—people’s illusion that acquiring wealth, posses-
sions and status will make them permanently happy. In fact, Smith (1759, III, iii,
209) argued, both pleasure and pain are often transient: “By the constitution of
4 An “ultimatum game” has two players. The first player is given a sum of money. The player is instructed
to offer some share of that money to the second player. If the second player accepts the division, then
both players keep the money. If the second player rejects the division, both players receive zero. In a
one-shot play of the game, if players are rational and self-interested, then the first player should offer the
second player only a minimal amount, which the second player will accept because it is better than
nothing. But when the game is actually played, small offers are commonly rejected (even for high
stakes), and even in a one-shot game, it is common for the first player to offer a 50:50 split of the original
stake. For expositions of the ultimatum game in this journal, see Thaler (1988) and Camerer and Thaler
(1995).
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human nature, agony can never be permanent.” Following a calamity, he noted, a
person “soon comes, without any effort, to enjoy his ordinary tranquility.” Smith
further observed that people not only adapt quickly to circumstances, but under-
estimate such adaptation and, as a result, often overestimate the duration of happy
and sad feelings:
A man with a wooden leg suffers, no doubt, and foresees that he must
continue to suffer during the remainder of his life, a very considerable
inconveniency. He soon comes to view it, however, exactly as every impartial
spectator views it; as an inconveniency under which he can enjoy all the
ordinary pleasures both of solitude and of society . . . . He no longer weeps,
he no longer laments, he no longer grieves over it, as a weak man may
sometimes do in the beginning.
Considerable modern research backs up Smith’s contentions. For example, Fred-
erick and Loewenstein (1999) show the short-term impacts on happiness of both
positive and negative outcomes. Indeed, Smith’s example of the man with a
wooden leg foreshadows a classic study by Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman
(1978) showing that the happiness of paraplegics and lottery winners tends to
revert surprisingly close to a normal baseline after their respectively tragic and
wonderful life-changing events. A large body of contemporary psychological re-
search also suggests that people typically believe that pleasure and pain will last
longer than they actually do (for example, Wilson and Gilbert, 2003).
At numerous points, Smith (1759, IV, i, 259) expresses skepticism about the
pleasure derived from possessions: “Howmany people ruin themselves by laying out
money on trinkets of frivolous utility?” Smith further believed that the primary
purpose of wealth-accumulation beyond a minimal level was not for consumption,
but for the social attention. “What are the advantages which we propose by that
great purpose of human life which we call bettering our condition?” Smith asked (I,
iii, ii, 70–71). “To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with
sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can
propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which
interests us.”
Smith devotes numerous pages of The Moral Sentiments to describing ways in
which the anticipation of status gained was much better than the realization, since
pursuit of status can backfire. Indeed, he argues (1759, IV, i, 260–261), even the
wealthy and great eventually recognize, albeit long after they can remedy the
situation, how little utility the goods they struggled so hard to procure have actually
provided:
Through the whole of his life he pursues the idea of a certain artificial and
elegant repose which he may never arrive at, for which he sacrifices a real
tranquility that is at all times in his power, and which, if in the extremity of old
age he should at last attain to it, he will find to be in no respect preferable to
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that humble security and contentment which he had abandoned for it. It is
then, in the last dregs of life, his body wasted with toil and disease, his mind
galled and ruffled by the memory of a thousand injuries and disappointments
which he imagines he has met with from the injustice of his enemies, or from
the perfidy and ingratitude of his friends, that he begins at last to find that
wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted
for procuring ease of body or tranquility of mind, than the tweezer-cases of
the lover of toys.
Smith would have done well to heed his own advice. He worked himself so sick in
drafting The Wealth of Nations that in 1773, he sent David Hume a letter making
Hume his literary executor in case he should die before publishing any of his
manuscripts (though as it turned out, Smith outlived Hume by 14 years).
Because the rich pursue ends that fail to make them happy, Smith (1759, IV,
i, 265) believed that they end up being no more happy than the poor: “In ease of
body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are really upon a level, and
the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security
which kings are fighting for” and “in what constitutes the real happiness of human
life, [the poor] are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much above
them.” Indeed, a large body of modern research on the determinants of happiness
has quite consistently found surprisingly weak connections between happiness and
wealth or income, especially over time or across countries (Easterlin, 1974; Diener,
and Biswas-Diener, 2002; Frey and Stutzer, 2002).
Yet while believing that consumption of goods, as well as wealth and greatness,
all provide only “frivolous utility,” Smith believed that the productivity of market
economy is driven by this “deception”—the misguided belief that wealth brings
happiness. As Smith (1759, IV, i, 263–264) notes, “[I ]t is this deception which
rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. It is this which first
prompted them to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found cities and
commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts, which
ennoble and embellish human life; which have entirely changed the whole face of
the globe.”
Indeed, Adam Smith even invokes the “invisible hand”—a term that may be the
the most prominent legacy of his work, although it occurs only once in The Wealth
of Nations and only once in The Theory of Moral Sentiments—to argue that as the
wealthy seek out goods and status that ultimately bring them little pleasure, they
inadvertently end up promoting the good of the poor.5 Here is Smith’s invisible
hand (1759, IV, i, 264) in The Theory of Moral Sentiments:
5 For discussion in this journal of the context for the “invisible hand” in The Wealth of Nations, see Persky
(1989). For a discussion in this journal of the “invisible hand” in the context of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments and Adam Smith’s ethical system, see Evensky (1993).
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“In spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their
own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours
of all the thousands whom they employ be the gratification of their own vain
and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their
improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same
distribution of the necessities of life which would have been made had the
earth been divided into equal portions among all inhabitants; and thus,
without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society.”
While perhaps overstating the case, when Smith refers to the equitable distribution
of the necessities of life he is arguing that the distribution of things that actually
bring happiness to people is far more equitable than the distribution of tweezer-
cases and other “trinkets of frivolous utility.” That the things that really matter for
happiness are more equitably distributed than those that don’t may help to explain
why cross-sectional differences in income seem to bring such small increments in
happiness.
Unexploited Ideas
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is not only packed with insights that
presage developments in contemporary behavioral economics, but also with prom-
ising leads that have yet to be pursued. Here we enumerate four of them: the desire
to be well-regarded by posterity; negative reactions to being misjudged; mistaken
belief in the objectivity of tastes; and sympathy for the great and rich.
A desire to be well-regarded by posterity certainly drives the efforts of many creative
professionals—artists, writers, architects and academic economists. As Smith (1759,
I, ii, 169) comments, “Men have voluntarily thrown away life to acquire after death
a renown which they could no longer enjoy. Their imagination, in the meantime,
anticipated that fame which was in future times to be bestowed upon them.” A
concern for one’s reputation to posterity might be thought of as reserved for the
richest and most powerful members of society, many of who do seem to care about
it based on the named buildings in universities and hospitals, but it is not limited
to the rich. Economists have studied the bequest motive, which is no doubt partly
fueled by this motive, but they have not yet explored what may be more potent
effects of posterity on current decisions—perhaps starting with the decision to have
children or to encourage grandchildren.
Economics generally assumes that people care about outcomes, not about the
source of outcomes. However, Adam Smith pointed out that people have negative
reactions to being misjudged that go beyond the outcome. Smith (1759, III, ii, 174)
drew special attention to one particular situation—that of “unmerited reproach,”
which, he noted, “is frequently capable of mortifying very severely even men of
more than ordinary constancy . . . . An innocent man, brought to the scaffold by
the false imputation of an infamous or odious crime, suffers the most cruel
10 Journal of Economic Perspectives
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misfortune which it is possible for innocence to suffer.” Resesarch on “procedural
justice” shows a substantial concern for whether a trial was fair, for example, as well
as for the outcome of the trial (Lind and Tyler, 1988). One study showed that the
propensity to file wrongful-termination lawsuits after firing is correlated with work-
ers’ perceptions of whether their firing was just (controlling for expected payoffs
from litigation; Lind, Greenberg, Scott and Welchans, 2000). This insight has
interesting implications for principal-agent theory. Smith’s insights suggest that
goodwill could be seriously eroded if a principal penalizes an agent who produced
a low level of output due to bad luck rather than poor effort.
Ample evidence—beginning with the huge cross-cultural differences in tastes
for food—suggests that tastes are subjective, based on a culture, familiarity and so
on. However, Smith argued that people underestimate such influences, having
instead a mistaken belief in objectivity of tastes. Smith (1759, V, i) commented, “[F]ew
men . . . are willing to allow, that custom or fashion have much influence upon
their judgments concerning what is beautiful, . . . imagine that all the rules which
they think ought to be observed in each of them are founded upon reason and
nature, not upon habit or prejudice.” Ross and Ward (1996) refer to the tendency
for people to think their own tastes and beliefs are more legitimate and more widely
shared than they really are as naı¨ve realism. Naı¨ve realism has potentially important
implications for a variety of economic issues: gift-giving; negotiations in which both
parties are likely to think that their own preferences are shared by the other side
more than they are; principal-agent situations in which the principal has to set
rewards for the agent; and sales and marketing (Davis, Hoch and Ragsdale, 1986).
It can also lead to cultural conflict. If those in one society believe that eating
monkey is inherently disgusting, then we are likely to disparage monkey-eaters,
rather than treating the tastes of those who disagree as akin to tastes for opera or
smelly cheese.
Finally, contrary to the sensible notion that one should sympathize with those
less fortunate than oneself, Smith (1759, iii, ii, 72–73) argued that there is a natural
tendency to experience sympathy for the great and rich:
When we consider the condition of the great, in those delusive colours in
which the imagination is apt to paint it, it seems to be almost the abstract idea
of a perfect and happy state. It is the very state which, in all our waking dreams
and idle reveries, we had sketched out to ourselves as the final object of all our
desires. We feel, therefore, a peculiar sympathy with the satisfaction of those
who are in it. We favour all their inclinations, and forward all their wishes.
What pity, we think, that any thing should spoil and corrupt so agreeable a
situation! It is the misfortunes of kings only which afford the proper subjects
for tragedy.
Smith’s description recalls the outpouring of grief after the accidental deaths of
Princess Diana and John F. Kennedy Jr. Popular Magazines like People and US, and
similar highly rated TV shows, are filled with stories about where athletes and stars
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shop, what they eat and wear and the ups and downs of their love lives. Fascination
with celebrity of this sort also has a direct economic effect through the use of
celebrities as marketing vehicles.
Smith believed both that this sympathy for the rich was a form of corruption
based on a moral mistake, and also that it provided an important underpinning for
social stability. Smith (1759, I, iii, iii, 84) described the moral mistake in this way:
“[T]hat wealth and greatness are often regarded with the respect and admiration
which are due only to wisdom and virtue; and that the contempt, of which vice and
folly are the only proper objects, is most unjustly bestowed upon poverty and
weaknesses, has been the complaint of moralists in all ages.” Indeed, Smith further
argued that the “disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the
powerful, and to despise, or at least, to neglect, persons of poor and mean
condition . . . is . . . the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our
moral sentiments.” However, Smith (I, iii, iii) also held that this sympathy was
“necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order
of society.” This sympathy for the rich may help to explain one of the puzzles of
capitalism: the failure of the majority democratic societies to impose extremely
high taxes on the richest members. Smith’s perspective suggests that maybe people
don’t want to tax the rich because average citizens don’t want to “spoil and corrupt”
what they perceive as the “agreeable situation” of the rich!
Conclusion
Adam Smith’s actors in The Theory of Moral Sentiments are driven by an internal
struggle between their impulsive, fickle and indispensable passions, and their
impartial spectator. They weigh out-of-pocket costs more than opportunity costs,
have self-control problems and are overconfident. They display erratic patterns of
sympathy, but are consistently concerned about fairness and justice. They are
motivated more by ego than by any kind of direct pleasure from consumption, and,
though they don’t anticipate it, ultimately derive little pleasure from either. In
short, Adam Smith’s world is not inhabited by dispassionate rational purely self-
interested agents, but rather by multidimensional and realistic human beings.
y Thanks to Kim Border for an apt Adam Smith quotation; to Eric Angner, James Hines,
Jesse Shapiro, Jeremy Tobacman, Timothy Taylor and Michael Waldman for helpful com-
ments; and to Ed Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer for encouragement.
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